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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff/Appellee, i 
V* 
GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ, \ 
Defendant/Appellant. \ 
Case No. 900212-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for injury to a 
jail or other place of confinement, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1990), in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court improperly admit defendant's 
offensive statements made to a police officer over defendant's 
objections of irrelevancy and prejudice; and did defendant waive 
his objections at trial to the admitting of such statements by 
failing to timely raise the objection prior to trial by a motion 
to suppress? Determinations on the admissibility of evidence 
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989). The issue of waiver must 
be determined as a matter of law. State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 
967-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. Did the court improperly deny defendant's motion to 
sever his trial from that of codefendant? The refusal to grant a 
motion to sever will not be overturned absent abuse of 
discretion. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440f 445 (Utah 1986); 
State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 876, 898 (Utah 1986). 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
request for a jury instruction on what constitutes "injury to a 
jail11 on the grounds that defendant's definition of "injury" 
required a showing of damage in excess of that required by the 
statute? An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instructions presents a question of law. Carpet Barn v. State of 
Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The trial court's 
legal conclusion is not accorded any particular deference and is 
reviewed for its correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
4. Did the trial court improperly refuse defendant's 
request for an included offense instruction on criminal mischief 
on the grounds that an acquittal on "injury to a jail" would 
necessarily entail acquittal on criminal mischief? Because this 
issue presents a question of law, it should be reviewed under the 
standard set forth in paragraph three, above. 
5. Should this Court review the host of alleged 
statutory and constitutional violations raised by defendant for 
the first time on appeal, unbriefed and without specification or 
citation to the record, in connection with defendant's claim that 
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he was unlawfully denied a free copy of a transcript of his 
preliminary hearing? Discretion to review lies within the 
appellate court. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 
1985); State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287, 287 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989). If this Court should 
undertake review, was defendant denied equal protection of the 
law by the trial court's refusal to provide him with a free copy 
of a transcript of his preliminary hearing when an audible tape 
recording was available for copying at no charge? Because this 
issue presents a question of law, it should be reviewed under the 
standard set forth in paragraph three, above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gregory Lynn Jaimez, and two co-defendants 
were charged by information with injuring a jail, a third degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1990) and reckless 
burning, a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
104(1)(a) (1990) (R. 2). Subsequently, the reckless burning 
charge was dismissed as to all defendants (R. 7). A preliminary 
hearing was held, and thereafter, defendant made a motion for an 
order for production of the preliminary hearing transcript. (R. 
11-13). Defendant's motion was heard and denied on February 20, 
1990 (Transcript of February 20, 1990, hereinafter "TA." 9-11). 
On March 9, 1990, defendant filed a motion for continuance and a 
-3-
motion to sever his trial from that of codefendant Jerry Lee 
Adderman and Kenneth Mark Smith (R. 18-25). The motions were 
denied in a telephone conference between the court and counsel on 
March 13, 1990 (R. 32). On March 14, 1990, defendant filed a 
motion in limine seeking to prohibit prosecution witnesses from 
making any reference to certain of defendant's statements on 
grounds of non-relevance and prejudice (R. 28-9). The trial 
court refused to hear this motion (see trial court's handwritten 
note at R. 28). After a trial on March 14 and 15, a jury found 
defendants Jaimez and Adderman guilty of the charged offense, and 
defendant was sentenced to a term of zero (0) to five (5) years 
in the Utah State Prison, to commence following his present term 
of incarceration (R. 62 and 65 and R. of Adderman, 46). Notice 
of appeal was filed on April 13, 1990 (R. 67). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 7, 1989, correction officer, Jay Nelson, 
Carbon County Sheriff's Office, was alone on duty in the Carbon 
County jail (T. 49-50). At approximately 11:30 p.m. Nelson heard 
a disturbance on the second level. Investigating, he found some, 
if not all, of the seven inmates then incarcerated, including 
defendant, in a common area (T. 56). Defendant asked to make a 
phone call and Nelson refused. Nelson then demanded defendant 
and the other inmates go to bed to which defendant answered, "No. 
Make us." Nelson then called for assistance (T. 57-8). Shortly 
afterward officers Jerry Cowan and Steven Raber appeared and 
conducted all prisoners to their cells without any problem (T. 
59). The three officers then went downstairs (T. 60). 
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Within five or six minutes the officers observed water 
issuing from the squad room ceiling. They went upstairs and 
found the cellblock floor flooded with approximately four to five 
inches of water. After turning off the water to the cells, the 
officers again returned downstairs (T. 60-62). Shortly 
thereafter, the officers observed bright moving flashes, 
indicating heat sources, on the television monitors trained on 
the cell block area containing defendant and codefendant 
Adderman. Ascending again, they found books burning (T. 66-69). 
The inmates were removed to the drunk tank, and the jail 
sergeant, officer Robert Kraync was summoned (T. 70). 
Officer Cowan testified that the inmates behaved 
boisterously while being removed to the drunk tank (T. 107). 
Over defendant's objections he was permitted to testify to 
defendant's offensive statements (T. 110). Raber also testified 
that defendant spoke abusively to him (T. 121), and was the most 
vocal of the inmates, hollering, "Don't give up, you guys, now" 
(T. 123). John Palacios, an inmate sharing cell #2 with 
codefendant Adderman (T. 161), testified that defendant said, 
"Let's show what we can do, because we're pissed off," followed 
by, "Let's flood the jail" (T. 162). 
As to the source of the flooding, Nelson testified that 
each cell had a toilet and sink operated by a push button within 
that cell (R. 70-71). Raber testified that he removed a roll of 
toilet paper from defendant's commode (T. 124). Cowan testified 
that the toilet in cell #1, defendant's cell, was overflowing and 
that toilet paper was stuffed in the commode and sink (T. 111). 
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Kraync testified that he saw enough debris in the sinks of cells 
#1 and 2 to plug them up (T. 140); and Palacios witnessed 
Adderman plug the toilet in cell #2 with a roll of toilet paper 
received from defendant (T. 164-165). Palacios also testified 
that he believed the toilets in all four cells were being flushed 
(T. 166). 
All four officers testified to damage caused by the 
water to the ceiling in the squad room (T. 71, 102, 125 and 133). 
Cowan testified that the entire ceiling and all the light 
fixtures in the squad room had to be replaced (T. 112). In 
cross-examination defendant and codefendant elicited from Cowan 
and Kraync that the flooding resulted in damage only to the squad 
room (T. 117, 151). 
Nelson testified concerning the physical layout of the 
jail as follows: The jail facility is a two-story building 
within the Sheriff's Office complex (T. 51, 54-5). Four cells, 
an isolation cell ("drunk tank") and other facilities are located 
upstairs (T. 51). On the first floor, immediately below the 
four-cell area is the booking area and squad room (T. 53). There 
are also two more cells on the first floor (T. 53). The door 
entering the booking area is locked at all times. The booking 
area communicates with the jailer's office and then the squad 
room which is next to the two-cell area (T. 54). The Sheriff's 
Office complex has another entry, the inner door of which is 
locked. The hallway beyond the inner door leads to the squad 
room and booking area (T. 55). 
As to whether the "jail" had been damaged, Cowan 
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testified that the squad room was used for "jail purposes" when 
inmates consulted with their attorneys or used the phone to call 
bondsmen (T. 104). In addition, Kraync testified that prisoners 
were booked in the squad room and that they were interviewed 
there by Adult Probation and Parole. He also testified that 
prisoners were not free to leave that area, that an officer 
oversaw the exit door during the day shift hours and that 
prisoners could be shut in the squad room behind a locked door 
(T. 132-33). 
In cross examining Cowan, defendant elicited that the 
squad room was only used as a place of confinement when prisoners 
were actually confined there (T. 113). Defendant elicited from 
Nelson that the squad room is a multipurpose room which could be 
used by officers during and after their shifts to visit and that 
attorneys were able to go into that room and had full access to 
it. Defendant also elicited that anyone could leave the building 
by pushing a release button located next to the exit door, and 
further, that the squad room had once been used for a celebration 
honoring the promotion of a sheriff to which the general public 
had been invited (T. 76-78)• 
Defendant testified that he told the other inmates not 
to give Cowan and Raber any problems; that he gave Adderman a 
roll of toilet paper; and that he also hollered concerning 
Nelson's denying him the use of the telephone. He also testified 
that although mad about his not being able to make another phone 
call, he did not make any statements about the officers' wives, 
nor did he plug up the sink or toilet or run water out of the 
toilet (T. 196-199). 
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Adderman did not take the stand. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's offensive statements were presumably 
admitted as circumstantial evidence of intent to do injury to the 
jail, and defendant failed to specify how he was prejudiced. 
Even if those statements were improperly admitted because more 
prejudicial than probative, the error was not substantially 
influential in bringing about defendant's guilty verdict based on 
the weight of evidence against him. Five witnesses testified 
consistently to defendant's leadership and participation in the 
flooding of the jail. Also, defendant neither moved for an order 
to suppress the offensive statements within five (5) days prior 
to trial, nor timely filed his motion in limine, as required by 
law. 
POINT II 
Defendant's motions to sever and to continue were 
properly denied. The motion lacked adequate and sufficient 
testimonials that codefendant's alleged testimony would either be 
offered or even be favorable. There was only scant evidence at 
trial that both defendants adopted mutually exclusive and 
irreconcilable defenses. All the evidence adduced at trial was 
pertinent to trying both defendants. Finally, the State's 
"tardy" delivery of codefendant's allegedly exculpating letter, 
upon which defendant based his motions, was at most harmless 
error because the letter was unauthenticated and thereby 
insufficient to support defendant's motions. 
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POINT III 
Defendant's request for a jury instruction pertaining 
to "injury to a jail" was properly refused based on a plain 
reading of the statute which is intended to promote the 
legislature's general purpose to severely punish those doing 
damage to a jail. The trial court properly employed both a 
common sense understanding and a standard definition of "injury" 
in providing the correct jury instructions. 
POINT IV 
Defendant's request for a lesser included instruction 
of malicious mischief was properly refused. Based upon the 
court's reasonable interpretation of the statute providing for 
the charged offense and the evidence adduced at trial, defendant 
could not have been acquitted of the crime charged and convicted 
of the "included" offense. Further, defendant failed to 
introduce evidence which would have provided the jury with a 
basis for convicting defendant of the "included" offense. 
POINT V 
All of the violations alleged in Point V of defendant's 
brief are raised for the first time on appeal. Further, 
defendant has not briefed a single assignment of error, nor 
specified precisely how he was actually harmed by not having a 
preliminary hearing transcript, nor even cited to the record. 
For all these reasons, this Court should decline to review 
defendant's claim that he was unlawfully denied his right to a 
free copy of a transcript of his preliminary hearing. In the 
event this Court undertakes review on this point, only 
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defendant's claim that he was denied equal protection of the law 
merits consideration. An indigent defendant is not entitled to a 
free copy of a preliminary hearing transcript if there is 
available to him an alternative substantially equivalent to a 
transcript. Here, audible tape recordings were available at no 
charge. Thus, it was not error to deny defendant a free 
transcript. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a 
free copy of the preliminary hearing is affirmable because it was 
ultimately supported upon proper grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S OFFENSIVE STATEMENT AS 
EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO INJURE A JAIL. EVEN IF 
SUCH STATEMENTS WERE INFLAMMATORY, THEY WERE 
RELEVANT AND INSIGNIFICANT IN THE LIGHT OF 
EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT. 
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly 
admitted offensive statements he allegedly made to officer Cowan 
on the grounds that they were irrelevant and prejudicial and 
admitted without a proffer (T. 102, 110). The argument is 
insufficient under the law. 
All relevant evidence is generally admissible and 
irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. The 
trial court is given broad discretion in the manner of conducting 
a trial and especially in the manner of receiving evidence. 
State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1977). The general 
rule is that the judgment of the trial court will not be reversed 
unless it has been shown that it abused its discretion. State v. 
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989). 
-10-
In the instant case, defendants were charged with 
injury to a jail or place of confinement, a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-8-418 (1990). Section 76-8-418 is part of that 
chapter within the Criminal Code providing for offenses against 
the administration of government, as opposed to mere offenses 
against property. Defendant's statements to Cowan (T. 110), 
given the context in which they were made, were a clear 
expression of anger and frustration suggesting an intent to do 
damage to whomever and whatever was restricting his freedom. 
Here, the court might reasonably have considered the offensive 
statements circumstantial evidence of defendant's state of mind 
with respect to those who managed his confinement and his 
consequent intent to injure the jail. 
Relevant evidence may be excluded if substantially more 
prejudicial than probative. Utah R. Evid. 403. State v. Lopez, 
626 P.2d 483, 485-86 (Utah 1981) (testimony of defendant's having 
kicked another man, while inflammatory, not prejudicial where 
relevant to defendant's credibility). 
In this case however, defendant has made no showing of 
any actual prejudice as a result of his statements to Cowan being 
Defendant also assigns as error the trial court's failure to 
give a lesser included instruction on criminal mischief pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1990) (Appellant's Brief at 29-31). 
That section provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if: 
(c) He intentionally damages, defaces, or 
destroys the property of another. 
The subdivision evidently applies to all structures and is not 
particularly directed to public buildings. 
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admitted. 
Even if the statements were erroneously admitted, the 
error is harmless. In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), 
the Utah Supreme Court laid out the harmless error standard: 
In State v. Bannerf we applied rule 30 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
nonconstitutional evidentiary error. That 
rule directs in part, "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded." To the same effect is 
rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The Court in State v. Bishopf unanimously 
held that whether reversible error occurs 
under rule 30 is determined by applying the 
test found in State v. Fontana. In Fontanaf 
we held that "affect the substantial rights 
of a party" means that an error warrants 
reversal "only if a review of the record 
persuades the [C]ourt that without the error 
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant.'" In 
Knightf the Court adopted an "erosion-of-
confidence" criterion to give substance to 
our "reasonable likelihood" standard. We 
stated that for an error to require reversal, 
the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine our confidence 
in the verdict. 
Id. at 477 (footnotes omitted). 
Admission of potentially prejudicial evidence is 
harmless where evidence of guilt is overwhelming. State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 477; State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 
(Utah 1988); see also State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 295-96, 
422 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1967) (finding defendant's threatening 
remarks ineffectual in determining jury's verdict when considered 
in light of all the evidence). In State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
-12-
While there is little doubt that some 
prejudice might result from the jury's being 
informed, however briefly, that a defendant 
had formerly been in jail, the prejudice must 
be such that it is unfair. Utah Rule of 
Evidence 103 provides in pertinent part 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is 
affected...." Thus, defendant must make some 
showing that the verdict was substantially 
influenced by the challenged testimony. As 
this Court said in State v. Malmrose, "\h]n 
erroneous admission of evidence is treated as 
harmless error absent a showing that it had a 
substantial influence in bringing about the 
verdict." 
Id. at 448 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
In this case, four deputy sheriffs and another inmate 
testified to defendant's acts and their results. Three of those 
witnesses testified as to defendant's remarks suggesting intent 
(T. 110, 121, 123 and 161-62); four of the witnesses gave 
evidence indicating that defendant's actions had caused the 
flooding (T. Ill, 124, 140 and 164-86); all four officers 
testified to the damage caused by the flooding (T. 71, 102, 125 
and 133). Thus, the weight of evidence tending to prove 
defendant's guilt was so substantial that any prejudice caused by 
the admission of defendant's remarks pales by comparison. 
Lastly, rule 12(b)(2) and (d), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, provides that motions concerning the admissibility of 
evidence shall be made at least five days prior to trial and that 
failure to object shall constitute a waiver. State v. Loe, 732 
P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987) (rule 12(d) invoked to support the 
admission of an allegedly involuntary, incriminating statement as 
to which defendant neither moved to suppress nor objected to at 
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trial); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984) (finding 
defendants waived any objections to the legality of their arrests 
by failing to object prior to trial). 
Defendant filed his motion in limine only fifteen (15) 
minutes before trial (R. 28-9), and apparently on this account 
the trial court declined to hear the motion. (See court's hand-
written note on Motion in Limine, R. 28). Defendant claims in 
his brief that he only learned of the State's intention to have 
Cowan testify concerning defendant's offensive statements shortly 
before trial (Appellant's Brief at 12, 16 and 21). The record is 
silent on this matter. Nonetheless, knowing that Cowan was a 
witness to the events at issue, defendant had good reason to 
believe that Cowan would be called to testify. More importantly, 
defendant knew from his presence at the preliminary hearing that 
Nelson, in addition to Cowan, might testify to defendant's having 
made the same offensive remarks at issue here. (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript, hereafter "TB." 14). Thus, defendant was on 
notice early in the proceedings of the alleged inflammatory 
statements and had plenty of time to move to suppress those 
statements. On such facts, this Court should find that defendant 
has waived his objection to the admitting into evidence of his 
offensive statements. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO SEVER AND FOR CONTINUANCE BECAUSE 
THEY WERE UNTIMELY FILED, FAILED TO SHOW THAT 
CODEFENDANT WOULD TESTIFY FAVORABLY AND THAT 
DEFENDANT AND CODEFENDANT HAD MUTUALLY 
EXCLUSIVE AND IRRECONCILABLE DEFENSES. 
The State substantially agrees with defendant's factual 
statement regarding this matter (Appellant's Brief at 23-24). 
Additional facts, especially those pertaining to the untimeliness 
of defendant's filing his motions to sever and for continuance, 
are developed in the latter part of the State's response on this 
point. 
Defendant argues that he was unconstitutionally denied 
his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor because the trial court refused to grant his motions 
(1) to sever defendant's trial from that of codefendant Adderman 
2 
and (2) for continuance. His motions are founded exclusively on 
his late discovery of a letter allegedly written by Adderman 
absolving defendant of guilt (R. 18-25). Even if the letter were 
authentic, it would have been insufficient in consideration of 
the other facts of this case to compel the granting of 
Defendant grounds his right to severance in the right to 
compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses made part of 
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant has not cited, 
and the State has not located, any authority supporting the 
theory that a right to severance is embraced by the right to 
compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses under the 
cited provisions of either the Utah or United States 
Constitutions. In fact, motions to sever the trials of jointly 
charged defendants are presently governed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-
8a-l (1990), a recodification of former section 77-35-9, and rule 
9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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defendant's motions to sever and for continuance. 
Rule 9(b) and (d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
governs the joinder and severance of defendants at trial. The 
rule provides that defendants jointly charged out of acts 
committed in the same criminal episode shall be jointly tried. 
If a defendant is prejudiced by the joinder the court may grant a 
3 
severance of trials. 
Applying rule 9, the Supreme Court stated, in Velarde: 
Accordingly, severance is not available 
as a matter of right. Instead, whether 
severance is granted depends upon whether the 
trial court determines that prejudice to the 
defendant outweighs considerations of economy 
and practicalities of judicial 
administration, with doubts being resolved in 
favor of severance. A denial of severance 
will only be reversed by this Court if it is 
affirmatively shown that a defendant's right 
to a fair trial has been impaired. 
Id. at 444-45. (footnote omitted). See also State v. Collins, 
612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980); and State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d, 
1338, 1350 (Utah 1977) (quoting State v. Pass, 30 Utah 2d 197, 
200, 515 P.2d 612, 614 (1973), for the general rule that joinder 
of defendants is the procedure employed when "it appears that 
persons were jointly involved in the commission of a crime so 
that evidence against one is largely applicable to the 
other..."). 
Here, all the evidence relating to the behavior of 
defendants, the physical setting of the premises and their use, 
the instrumentalities of causation (i.e. toilet paper in commodes 
controlled by a button within each cell), and the flooding and 
3 
Rule 9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, infra, Appendix A. 
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subsequent damage to the jail, was fully applicable to each 
defendant and necessary to the State's case against each. 
Considerations of economy and the practicalities of judicial 
administration clearly warranted a joint trial. 
Defendant alludes to the possibility of defendants' 
antagonistic defenses as a ground for severance (Appellant's 
Brief, at 24-25). Concerning antagonistic defenses the court in 
Velarde, stated: 
Antagonistic defenses alone are not 
sufficient to require a separate trial. The 
test of whether antagonistic defenses by two 
defendants require severance is whether the 
defenses conflict to the point of being '. 
irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. As 
indicated above, however, a trial judge's 
denial of severance will be reversed on 
appeal only if the conflict in the 
codefendants' respective positions at trial 
was of such a nature that, considering all 
the evidence in the case, the defendants were 
denied a fair trial. 
Id. at 445 (footnotes omitted). 
On the basis of such a rule, defendant's assertion of 
antagonistic defense is groundless. First, defendant did not 
specifically raise the issue of antagonistic defenses in his 
pretrial motion to sever (R. 18-23). In fact, defendant's motion 
clearly indicated that Adderman's testimony, if given, would 
support defendant's position. Thus, the trial court could not 
reasonably have granted a motion to sever based on defendants' 
alleged antagonistic defenses. Second, Adderman did not take the 
stand, instead putting the State to its proof. There is nothing 
in the trial proceedings that suggests that either Adderman or 
defendant adopted a theory that his own innocence was necessarily 
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dependent on the guilt of his codefendant. See State v. Hall, 
712 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah 1985) (motion to sever properly denied 
where defendant's assertion of inconsistent defenses was 
unsupported by testimony at trial). 
Defendant also argues that because Adderman could not 
be compelled to testify against himself he was unable to take 
advantage of exculpating admissions in a letter allegedly written 
by Adderman, and was therefore entitled to severance (T. 2-4; R. 
21-23). This argument is without legal merit. 
A criminal defendant's right to severance based on the 
alleged availability of his codefendant's exculpatory admissions, 
while a case of first impression in Utah, has been reviewed in 
the federal courts. In United States v. Causey, 834 F. 2d 1277 
(6th Cir. 1987), the court, presented with a fact pattern similar 
to that in this case, stated: 
Defendant Causey argues that even if he 
could not comment on the failure of one or 
the other defendants to testify, if tried in 
a separate proceeding one of the codefendants 
would have given exculpatory testimony. 
However, a motion for severance on the ground 
of absence of codefendant's testimony must be 
accompanied by more than a basic, unsupported 
contention that a separate trial would afford 
the defendant exculpatory testimony. A 
stringent test is to be employed in ruling on 
a motion for severance in order to obtain a 
codefendant's testimony. The defendant "must 
demonstrate: (1) a bona fide need for the 
testimony, (2) the substance of the 
testimony, (3) its exculpatory nature and 
effect and (4) that the codefendant will in 
fact testify if the cases are severed,•• 
Id. at 1287 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). See also United 
States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 590 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 105 S.Ct. 957 (1985) (motion to sever denied where 
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defendant failed to file affidavit satisfying prerequisites for 
severance); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1446 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (motion to sever denied where codefendants gave only 
conditional promise to testify at severed trial). These 
decisions show that the trial court must receive certain 
guaranties that favorable testimony will actively be developed at 
a later trial before granting a motion to sever. 
Here, defense counsel's Verified Motion To Sever (R. 
18-23) did not assert that defendant would call Adderman to 
testify, that Adderman would testify, or that his testimony would 
be favorable. Nor might defendant rely on Adderman's letter, 
purportedly exculpating defendant, since it could not have been 
4 
admitted unless Adderman testified at trial. On these facts the 
court properly denied defendant's motions to sever and for 
continuance (T. 2-4). 
Defendant also suggests that, with respect to both his 
motions to sever and to continue, he was prejudiced by the 
State's delivery of Adderman's allegedly exculpatory letter on 
The letter is hearsay under the basic definition. Utah R. 
Evid. 801(c). However, under subsection (d)(1) it would not be 
hearsay, and thereby admissible, jLf Adderman took the stand. See 
Appendix A. In this case Adderman refused to take the stand, and 
so the letter was inadmissible under this provision. 
Also, on the theory that Adderman's refusal to take the 
stand would make him "unavailable", the letter would still be 
inadmissible under rule 804(b)(3); 
A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible 
unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
In this case the letter's authenticity was uncorroborated. 
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March 9, 1990, only five days before trial, following two prior 
discovery requests. The suggestion is without merit. 
The prosecution has a continuing duty to disclose all 
relevant evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the accused. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. However, an error warrants reversal only if 
it appears that without the error "there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result to the defendant." State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (defendant prejudiced by 
prosecution's failure to disclose crucial witnesses). See also 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661-62 (Utah 1985) (prosecutor's 
failure to disclose witness not prejudicial error when weighed 
against substantial evidence tending to incriminate). 
In this case, the State's delivery of the letter five 
days before trial may be a deviation from procedure, but it is 
utterly irrelevant in this context. In Knight, and Carter on 
which defendant relies, the defendant was compromised by being 
confronted with the unanticipated testimony of witnesses whose 
trial appearance the prosecution had not disclosed. Here, in 
contradistinction, defendant was not confronted with any 
surprising testimony as a result of the State's "tardy" 
disclosure. Defendant simply received information, of doubtful 
authenticity, that clearly would not be used by the State at 
trial. In fact, the prosecutor did deliver th€> requested letter 
5 
only 3 days after it was first requested. 
See R. 19 and Appellant's discovery request of March 6, 1990, 
Appendix at 34. 
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To the extent that defendant claims Adderman's letter 
supports his motion to sever, he is also mistaken (T. 2-4). 
There was no evidence presented to the trial court that the 
letter was authentic or that Adderman would testify. Thus the 
letter was insufficient in providing the trial court with the 
assurances prerequisite to granting a motion to sever. See 
Causey, 834 F.2d at 1257. Further, even if the trial court did 
grant defendant a severance the letter might still be 
inadmissible, i.e., Adderman might still have concerns about 
being tried on additional charges, and so invoke his privilege 
against self-incrimination. In that case the letter again could 
not be introduced into evidence. Such speculations about the 
possibility of favorable evidence are not enough to support the 
granting of a severance. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 590. For all these 
reasons defendant was not prejudiced by the State's "tardy" 
disclosure. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIVINED LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES "INJURY TO A 
PUBLIC JAIL" IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-418 (1990) provides: 
Every person who willfully and 
intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or 
otherwise destroys or injures any public jail 
or other place of confinement is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree. 
No Utah appellate court has interpreted section 76-6-
418; however, the general interpretative provision of the 
See discussion of rules 801(d)(1) and 804(b)(3), supra, n.4. 
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Criminal Code, Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-106 (1990) provides some 
assistance: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be 
strictly construed shall not apply to this 
code, any of its provisions, or any offense 
defined by the laws of this state. All 
provisions of this code and offenses defined 
by the laws of this state shall be construed 
according to the fair import of their terms 
to promote justice and to effect the objects 
of the law and general purposes of Section 
76-1-104. ' 
A statute will be interpreted according to its plain meaning 
giving effect to the legislative intent. State v. Jones, 735 
P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. Ct. 1987).8 
7 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-104 (1990) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
The provisions of this code shall be 
construed in accordance with these general 
purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of 
offenses. 
o 
In Jones, 735 P.2d 399, appellant sought a reversal of her 
conviction of child abuse or, at least, a reduction to a 
conviction of a less serious offense. In support, she argued 
that "serious physical injury" referred to an individual act of 
abuse, whereas the lesser offense of inflicting "physical injury" 
included multiple acts, more applicable to her case. In 
rejecting this argument the court stated: 
[0]ne of the fundamental rules 
of statutory construction is 
that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in 
light of the general purpose it 
was intended to serve; and 
should be so interpreted and 
applied as to accomplish that 
objective. In order to give the 
statute the implementation which 
will fulfill its purpose, reason 
and intention sometimes prevail 
over technically applied 
literalness. 
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 
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Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied 
his request for a jury instruction in which culpable "injury" to 
a jail must be damage of equal gravity or consequence to 
"breaking down"/ "pulling down" or "destroying" a jail or other 
place of confinement (R. 38; Appendix B). In support, he seeks 
to import into this case a semantic analysis, undertaken by 
another court to determine legislative intent of an unrelated 
statute. 
Defendant's reliance on State in the Interest of 
J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980), to determine legislative 
intent is entirely inapposite to this case. There the statute 
first set forth specific, prohibited conduct, separated by the 
disjunctive "or" from the statute's second part, condemning 
conduct in generalized terms but expressed in a phrase having 
only one operative term. 
In contradistinction, section 76-8-418 has two 
operative terms in the disjunctive, "destroys or injures". These 
g 
terms have substantially different meanings. The differing 
definitions necessarily refer to different levels of prohibited 
8
 Cont. P.2d, 972, 974 (1965). To limit the 
Definition of "serious physical injury" to 
one individual "injury" in the literal sense 
would thwart the major purpose of the act, 
which is to curb the increase in child abuse 
by imposing stiffer penalties on child 
abusers. 
Id. at 402. 
g 
"Injure" - to inflict material damage or loss on. Synonyms -
harm, hurt, damage, impair, mar, spoil. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1164 (1971). 
"Destroy" - To ruin completely or to injure or mutilate beyond 
possibility of use, or by tearing, breaking, burning, erosion, 
etc. Synonyms - demolish, annihilate, dismantle, raze. 
"" " * *
 T
--
u ft4
-^"*i nirtionarv 710 (2nd ed. 1938). 
damage. Therefore, the statute, on its terms, makes criminal a 
broad range of damage, from "marring" or "spoiling" to 
"annihilation". Thus, the trial court was again accurate in 
recognizing that the level of damage in the jail was an "injury" 
under section 76-8-418 (T. 181-82, 230). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION: (1) GIVEN THE COURT'S REASONABLE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE AND GIVEN THE 
EVIDENCE, THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE ACQUITTED 
DEFENDANT OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE AND 
CONVICTED HIM OF THE INCLUDED OFFENSE; (2) 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE 
RELATED TO HIS REQUESTED CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 
INSTRUCTION. 
Due process entitles a defendant to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 637 (1980); State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984). 
But, this right is not absolute; it is limited by the evidence 
presented at trial. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 
1983). Thus, where as here, a defendant requests an instruction 
on a lesser included offense, the trial court is obligated to 
give the requested instruction only where: 
there is a 'rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included 
offense.' 
Id. at 159. It is not sufficient that the evidence simply 
provides a basis to acquit of the greater offense, it must 
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"simultaneously" provide a rational basis for the jury to convict 
of the lesser. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983), 
In the instant case criminal mischief would appear to 
be a lesser included offense of injury to a jail* However, the 
question before the trial court was whether, based on the 
evidence, there was a rational basis on which the jury could 
acquit the defendant of injury to a jail and convict him of 
criminal mischief (T. 231). To properly make such a 
determination, the court was obligated to view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to defendant and then, applying an 
evidence based standard, evaluate if a rational basis for 
acquittal of the charged offense and conviction of the included 
offense existed. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 532; State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. In performing this evaluation, the trial 
court properly denied defendant's requested instruction. 
First, the trial court recognized that a "jail" or 
"other place of confinement" included areas secondary and 
incidental to the caring and processing of prisoners (T. 182, 
instruction No. 6, R. 46, Appendix B). All the evidence showed, 
without exception, damage only to the "jail" as so recognized. 
Second, the trial court also recognized that essentially any kind 
of damage to the jail would constitute an "injury" (T. 182). The 
There is no Utah authority on this point. However, the State 
concedes that the first prong of the Baker test is satisfied. 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. There is overlap in the 
statutory elements: (1) both statutes provide for every possible 
degree of damage and (2) "property of another", pursuant to 
section 76-6-106, would encompass the term "public jail or other 
place of confinement" pursuant to section 76-8-418. 
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evidence showed, without exception, that the jail had sustained 
both "injury" and "destruction" by any definition of those terms. 
Therefore, the court properly reasoned that if the jury had 
acquitted defendant of injury to a jail it would necessarily have 
acquitted him of criminal mischief (T. 231). On such finding 
defendant was not entitled to the lesser included instruction. 
Finally, defendant's requested instruction was improper 
in form. The instruction required that damage supportive of 
guilt be $500.00 or less (R. 39, Appendix B). There was no 
evidence at trial as to the amount of damage sustained, and 
defendant did not offer evidence of damage in any amount. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A FREE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT WAS AN 
INFRINGEMENT OF THIS STATUTORY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IS (1) PROCEDURALLY 
DEFECTIVE AND (2) WITHOUT MERIT SINCE A 
SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENT IN THE FORM OF A TAPE 
RECORDING WAS AVAILABLE TO HIM. 
On appeal, defendant alleges that the trial court's 
denial of his Verified Motion for Order for Production of 
Transcripts ("Motion") is a violation of his federal and state 
constitutional and statutory rights. His arguments on this point 
are a veritable shotgun blast of unsupported assignments of 
error. Specifically, defendant alleges violations of due process 
and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution; denial of the rights of confrontation and effective 
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
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Constitution; and violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-1 and 77-
32-5 (1990)
 r providing for county assistance to indigent 
defendants. Excepting defendant's claim to rights as an indigent 
on equal protection grounds, these assignments of error are 
either improperly preserved or presented on appeal and are 
substantially without merit. 
A. DEFENDANT'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ARE 
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE ON APPEAL. 
1. Issue Raised First Time on Appeal. 
In State in Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), the Court stated: 
It is a fundamental principle of appellate 
review that matters not raised at the trial 
level cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal• • • • 
Moreover, this principle applies equally to 
constitutional challenges not presented 
below, but raised subsequently on appeal. 
Id. at 1291 (Court declines to review where juvenile court judge 
not given opportunity to rule on issues of constitutionality); 
see also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985) 
(failure to raise particular ground for suppressing evidence 
precludes consideration of appeal on that ground). 
In this case, defendant's Motion stated only that a 
transcript of the preliminary hearing was essential to his 
defense and that the court had determined him to be indigent and 
had appointed counsel (R. 11-13). The Motion was not accompanied 
by any memorandum indicating statutory or constitutional support 
for the request. At the hearing the trial court pointed out that 
defendant had not stated a reason for his need of the transcript. 
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In response, defense counsel stated only that he had taken 
insufficient notes and that he needed the transcript to prepare 
for trial. Thereafter, the trial court denied the Motion for 
failure to demonstrate some special need (TA. 9-11). During the 
hearing defense counsel stated no statutory or constitutional 
grounds in support of the Motion upon which the trial court would 
have had the opportunity to rule. 
2. Failure to Specify Error and Cite to the Record 
Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, state, 
in pertinent part; 
References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, 
or to pages of any statement of the evidence 
or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled in numerous instances that an 
appellant's failure to cite to the record in his brief is ground 
for assuming regularity in the proceedings and correctness in the 
judgment appealed from. State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287, 287 (Utah 
1986); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982). In State 
v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985), the court noted that 
defendant's failure to specify objectionable evidence and to cite 
to the record was in itself grounds for affirming the trial 
court's ruling. 
3. Defendant's Arguments are Not Briefed 
The Utah Supreme Court has declined to review unbriefed 
assignments of error even where constitutional issues were 
raised. See State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989) 
(court addresses only federal constitutional claim of denial of 
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confrontation where defendant failed to separately brief his 
claim under article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution); State v. Earlf 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) 
(court addresses search and seizure issue under fourth amendment 
to the United States Constitution alone where state 
constitutional analysis unbriefed); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1989) (court declines to rule on alleged 
unconstitutionality of statute under article I, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution where defendant fails to support argument with 
legal analysis),11 In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1988), the defendant claimed both federal and state 
constitutional violations, but did not argue that the analysis of 
his right to self representation would be different under article 
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution than that under the sixth 
amendment to the federal constitution. In declining to undertake 
a state constitutional analysis, the court stated: 
Unless the error is manifest on the record, 
not only must it be raised, but on argument 
must be briefed. This Court will not engage 
in constructing arguments out of whole cloth 
on behalf of defendants in capital cases. 
Id. at 1247 n.5 (emphasis added). 
Defendant's brief on this issue cites a host of alleged 
state and federal constitutional violations without the citation 
of a single authority. Defendant's failure to precisely specify 
the substance of his claims, unsupported by authority, leaves 
both the State and this Court without guidance in formulating a 
1 1
 But see State v. Cookf 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (court 
reviews pro se defendant's appeal to protect valuable 
constitutional right to jury trial, improperly denied). 
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response. Defendant's undeveloped arguments suggest that his 
claims are without substance. Indeed, the State believes that 
defendant's claims, excepting his right as an indigent to a 
transcript on equal protection grounds, are inappropriate and 
without sufficient substance to require hardly more than a 
12 
commensurate response. 
Right to Confrontation - "[t]he right to confrontation in the 
popular sense - means a 'face to face' meeting. Tacon v. 
Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 353 (1973); see also State v. Anderson, 
612 P.2d 778, 782-86 (Utah 1980) (denial of right of 
confrontation harmless where prosecution presented testimony of 
material witness at a preliminary hearing by extrajudicial 
affidavit); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-06 (Utah 1987) 
(erroneous denial of opportunity to cross examine accomplice for 
biased testimony a harmless infringement on right of 
confrontation). Here, all the State's evidence* was offered 
through in-court witnesses, each of whom defendant had an 
unfettered opportunity to examine at every stage of the 
proceeding. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - At the outset defendant does 
not claim that counsel was ineffective, counsel being the same at 
both trial and on appeal. The real thrust of defendant's 
argument is that the trial court rendered his counsel ineffective 
by denying him access to the preliminary hearing transcripts. In 
this sense defendant has really assigned error to the wrong 
source and thereby chosen an inappropriate theory. 
In any event, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel will be successful only if defendant can prove that "(1) 
his counsel rendered an objectively deficient performance, 
demonstrated by specific acts or omissions; and (2) counsel's 
error prejudiced defendant." State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 668, 
689 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The burden of proving these elements 
is on the defendant. State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 704 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). M[T]he claim may not be speculative, but must be 
a demonstrative reality. . . . " State v. Frame?, 723 P.2d 401, 
405 (Utah 1986). Defendant cannot show prejudice here: (1) the 
evidence for conviction was overwhelming (Appellee's Brief, pages 
12-13); and (2) defendant makes no allegation that counsel's 
performance was actually deficient. 
Violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-1 et seq (1990) - Evidently, 
title 77, Chapter 32, providing for counsel to indigent 
defendants is a codification of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights to counsel, and does not enlarge the scope of those 
constitutional rights. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247-
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Concerning the denial of his Motion, defendant has 
failed to specify how the lack of a preliminary hearing 
transcript rendered him ineffective or precluded confrontation. 
His brief contains not a single reference to the transcripts of 
Cont. 48. Further, the applicable provision, § 77-32-1(3) 
limits facilities to be provided an indigent defendant to those 
that are "necessary." See also Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah 
2d 6, 11, 447 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah 1968) (limiting defendant's 
right to a state paid investigator pursuant to predecessor 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-64-1 (1953 as amended)); accord 
State v. Cote, 27 Utah 2d 24, 26, 492 P.2d 986, 987 (Utah 1972). 
Section 77-32-5 specifies only the court which shall bear the 
expenses of transcripts without determining the right to a 
transcript. 
Denial of Due Process - A trial court's denial of a preliminary 
hearing transcript has been recognized as a denial of due 
process; however, where the right to a free transcript is made by 
an indigent defendant, courts have invariably analyzed the issue 
on equal protection grounds. United States v. Acosta, 495 F.2d 
60, 63 (10th Cir. 1974) (indigent defendant's right to free 
transcript, claimed under the fifth amendment to the United 
States Constitution, evaluated on equal protection grounds). 
In this case, defendant fails to clearly identify the 
precise constitutional provisions relied on: In his Statement of 
the Issues he claims a due process violation without identifying 
the particular constitutional provisions relied on. (Appellant's 
Brief at 2). Amendments five and fourteen to the United States 
Constitution and article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
all providing for the right of due process are set out in the 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes Ordinance and 
Rules section (Appellant's Brief at 3-4). However, defendant 
refers only to equal protection in his Summary of the Argument, 
Fifth Issue (Appellant's Brief at 19-20). Finally, in his Detail 
of the Argument, Fifth Issue, defendant makes no claim of a 
violation of his due process rights under either the Utah or the 
United States constitution. 
In view of the predilection of courts to review an 
indigent defendant's right to a preliminary hearing transcript on 
equal protection grounds, and defendant's indifferent claim of a 
due process violation, this Court may reasonably decline to 
review defendant's due process claim. See State v. Tuttle, 780 
P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989) (defendant's failure to brief claims 
of denial of rights to confrontation and due process pursuant to 
article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, precludes 
appellate review). 
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either the hearing on his Motion or the preliminary hearing, 
requested by defendant and made part of the record on appeal. 
The reasonable inference is that the events of those hearings do 
not support his claim that lack of a preliminary hearing 
transcript prejudiced him in preparing for or conducting trial. 
B. FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE TAPE RECORDING OF 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, THE SUBSTANTIAL 
EQUIVALENT OF A TRANSCRIPT 
A criminal defendant's right to a transcript of a 
preliminary hearing for the purpose of trial preparation has been 
recognized in both Utah and federal courts. See State v. Neeley# 
748 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Utah 1988); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 
40, 42 (1967); Gardner v. United States, 407 P. 2d 1266 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 911 (1969). That right was further 
developed in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), the 
leading case providing for an indigent's right to a transcript or 
its equivalent on equal protection grounds. 
In Britt, the defendant's first trial ended in a 
mistrial. In order to prepare for his next trial, defendant 
filed a motion alleging that he was indigent and requesting a 
free transcript of his first trial. The trial court denied the 
motion and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. In 
upholding the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its prior decisions regarding an indigent's right to a 
free transcript, stating: 
[t]his Court has identified two factors that 
are relevant to the determination of need: 
(1) the value of the transcript to the 
defendant in connection with the appeal or 
trial for which it is sought, and (2) the 
availability of alternative devices that 
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would fulfill the same functions as a 
transcript. 
Id, at 228 (emphasis added). Focusing on the second element the 
court noted that the trial took place in a small town in which 
the court reporter, apparently a good friend of all the local 
lawyers, was also reporting the second trial. Apparently, the 
reporter would have been available to read back his notes of the 
first trial well in advance of the second trial upon defense 
counsel's informal request. On such grounds the court held that 
the trial court had not committed error in denying defendant's 
request because the defendant conceded that he had available "an 
informal alternative which appears to be substantially equivalent 
to a transcript." j[d. at 230. 
Britt has been followed in a number of jurisdictions 
where the facts justify the application of its somewhat narrow 
holding. See State v. Kelley, 209 Kan. 699, 498 P.2d 87 (Kan. 
1972) (full access to reporter's notes constituted a fair and 
adequate alternative to a transcript where trial counsel, same as 
in preliminary hearing, acknowledged his recollection of the 
testimony); United States v. Talbot, 454 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 
1972) (access to reporter's notes and partial transcript an 
equivalent of a full transcript). 
In this case the preliminary hearing, of which 
defendant sought a transcript, was heard in the Seventh Circuit 
Court, Carbon County. These proceedings were tape recorded (R. 
13 7). The critical inquiry in this case is whether those tape 
The record indicates that the preliminary hearing was recorded 
on tape numbers 90-10/B510, 90-11 and 90-12/E 1200. 
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recordings were an alternative substantially equivalent to a 
transcript. 
Relying on Britt, courts have adopted a variety of 
approaches in determining the adequacy of tape recordings as 
substitutes for transcripts. In some cases courts have examined 
a wide variety of factors bearing on the defendant's capacity to 
adequately present his case without the traditionally relied-upon 
transcript. Thus, in Kirk v. State, 555 P.2d 85 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1976), the court held that tape recordings were an 
acceptable alternative to a completed transcript where defendant 
had available the court reporter's notes and a partially 
completed transcript. See also United States v. Vandivere, 579 
F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1979) (tape recordings adequate substitute 
where same counsel represented defendant at preliminary hearing 
and trial, separated by 18 days, and trial simple and with little 
conflict in testimony). 
In other cases the tape recording, as an advocate's 
trial instrument, is assumed to be a sufficient substitute for a 
transcript without any compensating factors, the inquiry 
explicitly or implicitly focusing only on the audibility of the 
tape recording. Thus, in Brinlee v. State, 543 P.2d 744 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1975), the court ruled that where defendant 
acknowledged that most of the tape recording was audible and 
there were only a few places where words might be misunderstood 
and the court, too, after listening, considered the tape 
"passable," the tape recording was held to be substantially 
equivalent to a transcript. See also Commonwealth v. Dean, 348 
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Pa. Super. 1, 501 A.2d 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (defendant's own 
tape recording of preliminary hearing held substantial equivalent 
of the transcript). Finding a tape recording of a preliminary 
hearing more than merely adequate, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
found tape recordings to be distinctly superior to the 
traditional transcript in evaluating witness testimony, preparing 
for trial and examining witnesses at trial. State ex rel. Moreno 
v. Floyd, 85 N.M. 699, 706, 516 P.2d 670, 677 (N.M. 1973).14 
Opposed to Moreno, as it pertains to the trial use of tape 
recordings, is United States v. Jonas, 540 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 
1976). There, defendant, convicted of receiving, concealing and 
storing treasury bills, moved the district court for a free 
transcript of his first trial to prepare for his new trial. The 
district court denied the motion, offering instead to make 
available its trial notes and the tape recordings for preparation 
and impeachment purposes. The seventh circuit held that "[t]he 
tape recordings did not allow counsel to adequately prepare for 
the second trial and were not an adequate substitute for a 
transcript for purposes of impeachment." .Id. at 569. 
Jonas differs from the instant case in particulars that 
were clearly determinative of its holding. First, defendant was 
represented by different counsel at each trial separated by 
approximately two and one-half months. Second, and most 
significantly, the tape recordings were available only during 
court hours in the office of the court reporter. 
In holding as it did Jonas also allowed for possible 
exceptions pertinent to this case: 
By our decision today we do not 
establish a per se rule that the government 
must provide a transcript following a mis-
trial. Under Britt there still may be 
available "an informal alternative which 
appears to be substantially equivalent to a 
transcript." However, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases we do not perceive that 
tape recordings or judicial notes will 
suffice. Admittedly there may be some trials 
where the testimony is short, simple and 
straightforward so that the preparation of a 
transcript would be unnecessary. 
Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
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In touting that superiority the Moreno court noted that 
an "[audio recording] adds an important and significant dimension 
to the understanding and evaluation of the spoken words." 516 
P.2d at 673. The court supported that observation by pointing 
out that the court had long recognized that the trier of fact, 
with its first-hand contact with witnesses, was better able to 
determine witness credibility and the weight to be given 
testimony than an appellate court limited to the written record 
of proceedings. j[d. at 674. 
In sum, while opposing authority exists, the trend 
appears to be that freely accessible audible tape recordings of a 
preliminary hearing, in relatively simple cases where the 
defendant is represented by the same counsel throughout the 
proceedings, constitute an alternative substantially equivalent 
to a written transcript. 
Notwithstanding the substantial equivalence of the 
preliminary hearing tape recordings to a written transcript, and 
its ready availability, the trial court's denial of defendant's 
Motion may have been an abuse of discretion. Here, in response 
to defendant's Motion, the trial court demanded a showing of 
unusual need, expressing a concern about needless expense of 
taxpayer money (TA. 9-11). While these concerns are valid they 
are evidently not sufficient to deny an indigent defendant access 
15 to a transcript as a satisfactory alternative.' Furthermore, in 
15 
Britt, 404 U.S. at 228, states that United States Supreme 
Court cases have consistently recognized the value to a defendant 
of a transcript of prior proceedings without requiring a showing 
of particularized need. However, in considering a defendant's 
need for a transcript on appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
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all cases the State has reviewed considering this issue, the 
trial court has at least presented an option in lieu of the 
requested transcript. Where the acceptability of the proffered 
tape recordings was undetermined by the trial court, the 
reviewing court has remanded the case for findings. See Morgan 
Cont. stated in the seminal case, Griffin v. Illinois/ 351 
U.S. 12 (1956): 
We do not hold that Illinois must purchase a 
stenographer's transcript in every case where 
a defendant cannot buy it. The [Illinois] 
Supreme Court may find other means of 
affording adequate and effective appellate 
review to indigent defendants. For example, 
it may be that bystanders' bills of 
exceptions or other methods of reporting 
trial proceedings could be used in some 
cases. 
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Considering the same issue the court in Draper v. 
Washington/ 372 U.S. 487 (1963)/ expressed the opinion that where 
portions of the transcript were not germane to the issue on 
appeal the state need not waste its funds by providing what was 
unnecessary for an adequate appellate review. jEd. at 495-96. 
See also Morgan v. Graham/ 497 P.2d 464, 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1972) ("costs to the state, while no yardstick of a defendant's 
rights, is still a practical consideration"). 
In Vandivere, 579 F.2d 1240f 1243 (10th Cir. 1979)/ the 
tenth circuit found tape recordings of a preliminary hearing 
satisfactory alternatives to the written transcript. In so 
holding, the court relied partly on rule 5.1f Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, providing for a method by which a defendant 
might secure a tape recording of the preliminary examination. In 
support, the court quoted the advisory committee as follows: "The 
new rule is designed to eliminate delay and expense occasioned by 
the preparation of transcripts where listening to the tape 
recording would be sufficient." Ibid, (citation omitted). 
In Utah, the preservation of circuit court proceedings 
is provided for by law. CJA Rule 4-201(2)(A). A tape may be 
duplicated for $5.00, unless the requesting party is impecunious. 
CJA Rule 4-202(8)(B) (emphasis added). One can only assume that 
rules 4-201(2) (A) and 4-202(8)(B) were designed with the same 
expense saving idea in mind as that of their federal 
counterparts. 
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v. Graham, 497 P.2d 464, 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (remanded 
for evidentiary hearing to determine the value of the transcript 
to the defendant and the availability of alternative devices 
which would fulfill the same functions as a transcript). 
However, the trial court's denial of the preliminary 
transcript may not have been error at all, under the 
circumstances of this case. In Britt, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the trial court's denial of the transcript 
of the defendant's first trial was not error where the court 
reporter would have at any time prior to the second trial read 
back his notes of the first trial "if counsel had simply made an 
informal request," Id. at 230 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the tape recordings of the preliminary 
hearing were available for copying at no charge* to defendant. 
The transcriptions of those tape recordings, made pursuant to 
defendant's request in support of his appeal, demonstrate that 
they were very audible, preserving virtually all the testimony. 
Additionally, almost all the surrounding factors supporting the 
use of tape recordings of prior proceedings in lieu of written 
xu
 CJA Rule 4-201(2)(A) and 4-202(8)(B), supra, n.15. 
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The transcript of the preliminary hearing is 159 pages in 
length. There are 19 notations of "inaudible" (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript Vols. I and II, "TB." 19, 20, 24, 26. 35, 75, 
76, 82, 86, 90, 95, 97, 104, 107, 112, 113, 123 and 130). These 
notations indicate omissions representing only a tiny fraction of 
the entire testimony. It is apparent from the flow of testimony 
that in each instance of inaudibility only a few words at most 
are omitted and that no significant testimony was lost, the 
meaning being readily reconstructed from the surrounding text. 
The entire closing argument of all parties and the court's review 
of the evidence to determine the existence of probable cause is 
completely intact. 
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transcripts are present here: (1) defendant was represented by 
the same counsel at all stages of the proceedings; (2) the 
preliminary hearing lasted only one afternoon (R. 5 and 7); (3) 
the testimony at trial lasted little more than half a day (R. 33-
35); and (4) the preliminary hearing and trial were separated by 
only seven weeks. The only factors missing are the trial court's 
possibly suggesting an alternative to a transcript and 
defendant's not conceding his access to a substantial equivalent 
of a transcript. See Brittf 404 U.S. at 228-30. Neither of 
these factors are relevant to this case. 
Defendant would have known from his own experience and 
observation, resulting from his every appearance in circuit 
court, that the proceedings were being tape recorded. No 
suggestion from the trial court should have been necessary to 
alert defendant to this possibility. 
More importantly, defendant, in the diligent pursuit of 
his own defense, should have listened to the tape recordings and 
made copies if he felt it important. See Jackson v. Dabney, 645 
P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982) (attorney required to represent 
client's interests with competence and diligence). At least one 
jurisdiction has made a defendant's exercise of due diligence a 
prerequisite to obtaining a copy of a transcript of his 
preliminary hearing. Kirk, 555 P.2d at 87 (indigent defendant 
who had ample opportunity to take advantage of tape recording of 
preliminary hearing could not contend that transcript of 
preliminary hearing was not available). Here, following the 
trial court's denial of his request for a free transcript, 
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defendant failed to take the obvious course of listening and 
copying the tape recordings of the preliminary hearing* On such 
facts defendant cannot now claim that the trial court erred when 
it denied him a free copy of a written transcript of the 
18 preliminary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j£ day of March, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
s-s 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Keith 
H. Chiara, attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 955, Price, Utah 
84501, this X daY o f March, 1991. 
ykL~z%'<f./Z~~^ 
18 
Ultimately, the trial court's ruling was proper, for while 
defendant need not demonstrate any unusual need for a transcript, 
as here required by the court, defendant nonetheless had 
available a substantially equivalent alternative. "On appeal 
[the Supreme Court] may affirm the trial court's decision on any 
proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another 
reason for its ruling." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 
1985). 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 76-8-418 
76-8-418. Damaging jails. 
Every person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or 
otherwise destroys or iqjures any public jail or other place of confinement is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-418, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-8-418. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 9. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct 
or in the same criminal episode. 
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or sepa-
rately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they 
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, 
orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information, or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of 
separate counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other 
relief as justice requires. 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the 
motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by 
defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose any 
statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence 
at the trial. 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial 
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The follow-
ing shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the 
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant 
relief from such waiver. 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of 
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974) except that prior to the word 
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United 
States" have been added. 
Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also 
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974). 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(19V1> except that "surprise*' is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise." 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following 
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference, 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving him; or 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such actios as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice 
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Rule 4-201. Record of proceedings. 
Intent: 
To establish the means of maintaining the official record of court proceed-
ings in all courts of record. 
To establish the manner of selection and operation of electronic devices. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(2) Electronic recording systems. 
(A) The official verbatim record of court proceedings in the Supreme 
Court, Court of Appeals, Juvenile Court, and Circuit Court and before 
Court Commissioners shall be maintained by a suitable electronic record-
ing system as approved by the Council. 
Rule 4-202. Records dissemination. 
Intent: 
To adopt uniform guidelines for the dissemination of information from court 
records. 
To provide definitions and classification of records maintained by the judi-
cial branch of government. 
To provide guidelines for the courts in permitting access to records without 
impairing the necessary day to day activities of the court. 
Applicability: 
This rule applies to all courts of record and not of record and the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts. The Juvenile Court Act and the Juvenile Court 
Board's rule primarily govern access to juvenile court records. However, this 
rule applies to Juvenile Court records where the Juvenile Court Act and 
Board rule are silent with regard to the specific writing or record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(8) Except in cases where the requesting party is impecunious, costs will be 
assessed as follows: 
(B) The charge for tape duplication will be $5.00 per tape. 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PIai nti ff ; 
vs. 
GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ, 
Defendant -
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Cr i m in a1 No. 90-3 
COMES NOW the Defendant and requests that the Court give the 
requested jury i nstructions„ 
DATED this 15th day of March, 1990. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Attorney at Law 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Requested Jury Instruc-
tions to Gene Strate, Carbon County Attorney, 123 East Main St., 
Price, Utah, 84501, this 15th day of March, 1990. 
/ 
INSTRUCTION No._ 
You are instructed that i f you -find from the evidence that 
damage was done to the jail or other place o-f confinement, that 
before that damaqe is considered sufficient to be considered an 
"injury" to the jail, that damage must be o-f equal gravity or 
consequence with "breaking down", "pulling down" or "destroying" 
a jail or other place o-f confinement. 
it 
ui 
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INSTRUCTION No. 
You a.r^ instructed that if you do not find the Defendant 
guilty of injuring jails, you may find the Defendant guilty of a 
lesser included offense of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misde-
meanor. 
To find the Defendant guilty of Criminal Mischief, you must 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following elements of that 
crime: 
1- That the Defendant, on or about the 7th day of November, 
1989, 
2. Intentionally damaged, or defaced the property of anoth-
er, 
3- The dollar amount of the damage was not shown by any 
e v i dence , t o b e (nor e t h an $• 500 - 00 „ 
,/ J 
fc/lr 
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HAR 15 1230 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBOM jCOUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs ; 
GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ, | 
JERRY LEE ADDERMAN, ] 
Defendants. 
) COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
1 TO THE JURY 
i Criminal No. 90-3 
i Criminal No. 90-4 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
The Defendants, GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ and JERRY LEE 
ADDERMAN, are accused by an Information filed in this Court 
by the County Attorney for Carbon County, State of Utah, of 
having committed the following crimes: 
Count I INJURING A JAIL, in violation of Section 
76-8-418, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, in that 
the said defendants, on or about November 7, 
1989, at Carbon County, State of Utah, did 
injury to a public jail or other place of 
confinement. 
